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0. Introduction
Mam is a Mayan language spoken by upwards of 700,000 people in Guatemala‘s
Western Highlands. Data for this paper were elicited from speakers in the town of
Comitancillo, San Marcos, a major town in the Central Mam area. I also cite data
from Northern Mam, centered in the department of Huehuetenango, and I allude
to data from Tacaneco (Western) Mam. In this paper I compare the Mam posses-
sive paradigm as instantiated by speakers from these areas and I discuss some of
the paradigm’s morphological implications.
It has long been advanced that Maya-Mam possessives encode an inclu-
sive/exclusive distinction for first person plural (England 1983; Ortiz Maldonado 
2004), but that, otherwise, the possessive paradigm lines up with Spanish or 
English with basically first, second, and third person distinctions in both singular 
and plural forms. See Table 1 in (1) below, based on the obligatorily possessed 
stem –xjalil2 ‘people’. 
(1)  
Table 1: Possessive paradigm, Northern Mam; adapted from Ortiz Maldonado 
(2004:86) 
1P.IN q-xjalil ‘our IN people 
1S n-xjalil-a ‘my people’ 1P.EX q-xjalil-a ‘our EX people 
2S t-xjalil-a ‘your people’ 2P ky-xjalil-a ‘you all’s people’ 
3S t-xjalil ‘his/her people’ 3P ky-xjalil ‘their people’ 
1Thanks to Thomas Godfrey, David Odden, Steve Marlett, and David Weber for comments on 
early drafts of this paper. Of course, any oversights and errors in analysis are my own.  
2Data are written in practical orthography. Assume Spanish pronunciation except that ky and q are 
palatal and uvular stops; x and j are retroflexed and uvular fricatives. Tx is a retroflexed affricate. 
Stops and affricates followed by ’ are glottalized, and glottal stop is indicated by ’. In this article, 
the dash is used only to separate morphemes within the possessive forms being considered. 
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1. The Inclusive/Exclusive Distinction 
Many languages grammaticalize the distinction between first person plural 
inclusive and exclusive. For example, if I talk to my wife about our honeymoon, 
she’s included in the event, whereas if I talk to you about our honeymoon, you are 
excluded. In English this is vague—grammatically if not semantically—whereas 
in Mam, and many other languages, particularly Austronesian and Dravidian 
languages, and Amerindian languages like Quechua and Mam, the difference is 
coded. 
We can see that, aside from the stem itself, the possessive forms all have a 
prefix—either n- or t- for singular forms, or q- or ky- for plural forms. In addition, 
first and second singular and first person plural exclusive and second person 
plural also have an enclitic -a. 
About these possessive forms, England, says: Nouns “are inflected for posses-
sion using a set of prefixes and accompanying enclitics” (1983:66, emphasis 
WMC).  
Maldonado Andrés, et al. say, “Possessed nouns are indicated by means of a 
set of prefixes and enclitics which together refer to grammatical person and 
number of the possessor” (1986:xxv, emphasis and translation from Spanish, 
WMC). 
 According to Feliciano and Jiguan, these clitics are “a group of elements that 
complete the pronouns and follow the possessed nouns” (2002:30-31, emphasis 
and translation from Spanish, WMC).  
Under each of these analyses the -a clitic is part of the unit of possessive mor-
phology, that is, it is part and parcel of the affixal forms for first and second 
person singular, first person plural exclusive, and second person plural, and 
apparently inseparable from them. In other words, third person singular forms are 
marked with a prefix only, as are first person plural inclusive and third person 
plural, whereas the remaining forms are marked by a discontinuous affix com-
prised of both a prefix and the -a enclitic. 
What we see portrayed, then, in (1), is a basic first, second, third person singu-
lar and plural paradigm, similar to Spanish or English, but with the addition of the 
inclusive/exclusive distinction in first person plural. 
This analysis works in the sense that it maintains a distinction among the sev-
en attested possessive forms by means of the interaction of the four prefixes and 
the presence or absence of the clitic. On the other hand, it doesn’t provide for any 
interesting generalizations about the use or function of the enclitic -a nor of the 
prefixes themselves. This is unfortunate, since it seems that there is more at play 
in these data than simply seven distinct grammatical items, both in terms of the 
prefixes as well as the appearance, or not, of the clitic. 
 
2. An Alternative Analysis 
I suggest a different analysis based on data from Comitancillo, where, by my 
reckoning, the clitic does not merely accompany the prefixes, but its occurrences 
are essentially independent of them. 
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(2) 
Table 2: Possessive paradigm in Central Mam 
 
1S.IN n-xjalil ‘my IN people’ 1P.IN q-xjalil ‘our IN 
people 
1S.EX n-xjalil-a  ‘my EX people 1P.EX q-xjalil-a ‘our EX 
people 
2S t-xjalil-a ‘your people’ 2P ky-xjalil-a ‘you all’s 
people’ 
3S t-xjalil ‘his/her people’ 3P ky-xjalil ‘their 
people’ 
 
Note that the Comitancillo data in (2) correspond exactly with the Ixtahuacán 
data in (1) except for the additional first person singular form at the top left of the 
table, a form I’m presently calling first person singular inclusive. This form nicely 
fills in the paradigm, much like fitting the final puzzle piece in its place.  
Interestingly, the additional form n-xjalil, selects from the same inventory of 
prefixal and clitic forms as the other members of the paradigm instantiated in both 
(1) and (2). In other words, n-xjalil doesn’t simply fit the paradigm, it seems to 
belong there. The paradigm in (2) vis-à-vis (1) gives rise to several questions: 
What do the prefixes and the clitic mean? Do they simply mark person and 
number as England and Maldonado Andrés et al. suggest, or could they be coding 
something more? Are the prefixes and the clitic interdependent as claimed by 
proponents of the traditional analysis, or are they largely independent, as I claim 
they are in the Comitancillo data? And does the Comitancillo data help us under-
stand what’s going on in the Ixtahuacán data, or perhaps even in the larger Mam 
area? 
In Mam, when people talk about ‘my anything’, they normally exclude the 
interlocutor—my house, my book, and my brother are all mine, not yours. And if 
a Mam school teacher is speaking to me, and wants to say something about her 
indigenous students and their families, she would call them n-xjalil-a ‘my 
people—not yours’. This would be true for both Ixtahuacán and Comitancillo 
speakers. Indeed, this is the only first person form attested in the Ixtahuacán data 
in (1). However, were a school teacher in Comitancillo to address her own people 
at a town meeting, she could say, as in sentence (3): 
 
(3)  Ayi’y n-xjalil, noq same, o’kx kab’e tal yol kxel nq’ma’n kye’y. 
 My people, excuse me, I have just a few words to address to you. 
 
The absence of the enclitic -a in the form n-xjalil in (3) codes that the people 
are included in some way in the possession—even though it’s a singular form. 
Whereas first person singular n-xjalil-a codes ‘my people, not yours’, n-xjalil 
codes ‘my people—including you’, or ‘my people, which are also your people’. In 
other words, Comitancillo first person singular inclusive and exclusive possessive 
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forms pattern just like the inclusive and exclusive marking on first person plural 
forms.  
These first person inclusive forms are common in direct address: N-k’wal ‘my 
child’, said by a man addressing his son or daughter, n-chmil ‘my husband’, said 
by a woman addressing her husband, w-erman (a borrowing from Spanish herma-
no ‘sibling’) used to address ‘my brother or my sister’, usually in a religious 
context (initial w- is an allomorph of n- which occurs before vowel initial roots or 
stems). Interestingly, this first person singular inclusive form can also be extended 
to non-humans, or even non-sentient addressees as with n-chej ‘my horse’, n-ja 
‘my house’, or n-tx’otx’, ‘my land’, where in (4) I address my land in a kind of 
soliloquy. Compare sentences (4) and (5). 
 
 (4) Ay, n-tx’otx’, k’u’jlinxix wu’n, jun t-ky’iwb’il q-Man wi’ja,  
 My beloved land (note lack of clitic –a in n-tx’otx’), you are a blessing of
 our Father to me.  
 
(5)  Ajo lo n-tx’otx’-a.  
 This is my land (note word final –a), ‘my land, not yours’.  
 
From these facts, it appears that for Comitancillo, we clearly have some kind 
of inclusive-exclusive distinction in 1st person singular as well as in 1st person 
plural.  
If we ignore the clitics (for now) and just look at the prefixes in (2) above, we 
have a two by two grid with first person in the top half of the table and non-first 
person in the bottom half, and with singular forms to the left and plurals to the 
right. There is a two-way distinction between singular and plural and, likewise, a 
two-way distinction of person—first person and non-first person—not a three-way 
distinction. 
Now consider the final -a, the clitic. In the first person singular and first per-
son plural forms in (2) above, it appears that the clitic codes exclusivity, as 
discussed previously. The forms unmarked with the clitic appear to code inclu-
sivity. The rub with committing to the clitic as a marker of exclusivity is what to 
make of the second person forms, i.e. the clitic’s co-occurrence with the t- and ky- 
prefixes: singular t-xjalil-a ‘your people’ versus t-xjalil ‘his or her people’, as well 
as with the plural forms: ky-xjalil-a ‘you all’s people’ versus ky-xjalil ‘their 
people’. If the clitic is indeed a marker of exclusivity, who is being excluded in 
the non-first person forms? 
So at first blush, it seems that in first person, both singular and plural, the clit-
ic distinguishes exclusive from inclusive forms, while in the non-first person 
forms, it distinguishes traditional second from third person. In other words, the 
clitic does double duty. England (1976:260) acknowledges the notion of the 
disparate functions of the clitic, saying: “The enclitics on the first-person forms 
indicate absence of second person, while the enclitics on the remaining forms 
indicate presence of second person”. Nevertheless, the traditional analysis wisely 
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rejects this split personality for the clitic. Why have what appears to be the same 
form doing two different things in very similar morphological contexts–one time, 
distinguishing inclusive from exclusive and another time distinguishing second 
person from third in both singular and plural? In order to avoid this, proponents of 
the traditional analysis atomize the entire possessive paradigm and conclude that 
each form is different from every other one based on the interplay of the four 
prefixes and the single clitic, just as if they had totally differently phonological 
shapes, as in English: my, your, our, their, etc. This is basically what Maldonado 
Andrés et al. claim above—that the prefixes and clitic together refer to grammati-
cal person and number of the possessor. What this leaves us with are seven 
different unrelated forms, in (1)—or eight forms in (2). By this analysis, the 
prefixes and clitic are interdependent, together distinguishing person and number, 
nothing else. 
The traditional analysis can account for the data, even the additional first per-
son singular form in (2), but it does so by ignoring the categories that the lan-
guage itself presents. Looking at those forms in (2) which include the clitic, I 
suggest, following Godfrey (1981), that what the clitic encodes is not exclusivity 
but rather the lack of solidarity between the interlocutor and the speaker. This 
may sound like a rose by any other name (that ‘lack of solidarity’ is just another 
name for exclusivity), but it nicely solves an interesting problem, the seemingly 
disparate functions of the same clitic in the first person and non-first person 
forms. 
What the language gives us data-wise, then, is a two by two by two matrix of 
person, number, and solidarity between speaker and hearer. To discuss this 
matrix, I will first tease it apart, beginning with Table 3 in (6) below. 
 
(6) 
Table 3: Comitancillo Mam singular possessor inflectional marking3
 
 
  n-  t- 
 
 -Ø Sp ȁ H ~ Sp ȁ ~ H 
  (1S.IN) (3S) 
 
 -a Sp ȁ ~ H ~ Sp ȁ H 
  (1S.EX) (2S) 
 
 
To understand the table in (6), begin at the left, which shows those forms pre-
fixed with n- ‘first person singular’. The top left box has no clitic and therefore 
codes solidarity between singular speaker and hearer. Speaker is possessor and 
                                                 
3Abbreviations used in this paper are minimal: S singular, P plural, IN inclusive, EX exclusive, Sp 
speaker, and H hearer. 
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speaker and hearer are both involved in the possession, or, as formalized, both 
speaker and hearer, or, roughly, what I’m presently calling ‘first person singular 
inclusive’. 
The bottom left box includes both the first person singular prefix n- and the 
clitic –a which marks unequal involvement or lack of solidarity between speaker 
and hearer, or, more formally, speaker and not hearer, or, roughly, ‘first person 
singular exclusive’. 
The second column shows those forms prefixed with t- ‘non-first person sin-
gular.’ The top right box has no clitic and therefore codes solidarity between 
speaker and hearer: neither speaker nor hearer; in other words, ‘third person 
singular’. 
The bottom right box has both the non-first person singular prefix t- and the 
clitic –a which marks lack of speaker-hearer solidarity, or not speaker but hearer. 
This codes traditional second person singular. The plural paradigm in (7) works in 




Table 4: Comitancillo Mam plural possessor inflectional marking 
 
  q-  ky- 
 
 -Ø Sp ȁ H ~ Sp ȁ ~ H 
  (1P.IN) (3P) 
 
 -a Sp ȁ ~ H ~ Sp ȁ H 
  (1P.EX) (2P) 
 
 
3. Possessives as Deictic Forms 
All pronominal forms are deictic in nature, possessives included. Pronouns and 
other deictic forms are indicators or pointers, which are relative to and grounded 
in the extra-linguistic context—terms like here and there, now and then, I and 
you, and, for the present focus—my and your—which have no specific reference 
aside from the context of speech. Deictic forms take their meaning from the 
moment of utterance and the participation schemes involved in direct speech. 
Who the word I references, depends upon who is speaking.  
The physical context of utterance requires a deictic center or origo, a center 
stake from which all deictic notions are calculated, historically considered to be 
ego- or speaker-centric. As Fillmore suggests:  
 
I carry around with me, everywhere I go, my own private world. The spatial centre of 
this world is my location…the temporal centre of this world is the passing moment of my 
consciousness…the social centre of this world is me” (1998:40-41).  
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Lyons restates this even more succinctly, saying: “The canonical situation-of-
utterance is egocentric” (1977:638).  
 
4. Ego-centrism and Socio-centrism 
The matrix for Mam possessive prefixes is indeed egocentric in its coding. The n- 
codes the speaker as the singular possessor, the t- codes other-than-speaker as the 
singular possessor. The prefixes give us two options for person, not three: ‘my’ or 
‘not my’, a coding of quintessential egocentricity. The clitic, on the other hand, 
calls upon speaker solidarity with the interlocutor. Whereas the prefixes n- and t- 
emerge from a binary, egocentric notion of origo, the clitic depends on a socio-
centric origo (Hanks 1990). It codes interlocutor solidarity with the speaker. In 
other words, the clitic operates independently of the prefixes in the sense that its 
meaning is orthogonal to the meaning of the prefixes.  
This analysis give us a two by two by two matrix which codes the interaction 
of participants of the socio-center, most basically, a speaker and a hearer. The 
paradigm provides coding for singular or not, involvement or not of the speaker as 
possessor, and solidarity or not of the speaker and hearer. Number is orthogonal to 
the deictic center, but our other two categories, speaker involvement and speaker-
hearer solidarity, are not. I’ve suggested that the marking of speaker involvement 
by means of prefixes, codes egocentrism. Either I own it or I don’t. Hearer 
solidarity with the speaker is marked by the presence or absence of the clitic. This 
codes for the socio-center of both speaker and hearer, not simply the ego-center of 
speaker alone. With this notion of socio-centricity and the terms socio-center and 
socio-centric, I follow Hanks 1990.  
The strength of this analysis’ two by two by two array is that it is based on the 
data as they appear, not as we overlay them with a first, second, and third person 
paradigm from outside the language itself. The matrix gives us 2 cubed or eight 
possibilities—all of which are attested in the Comitancillo data, and only one of 
which is not attested in the Ixtahuacán data.4
Hanks, in opposition to Fillmore and Lyons, claims that egocentricity is not 
the right way to ground the deictic field, that the deictic center isn’t egocentric—a 
bubble around the speaker, a center from which all deictic notions find their place. 
Rather, for Hanks, the deictic center is socio-centric—a bubble around a speaker 
and his or her interlocutor(s). And these interlocutors and all significant others get 
situated inside or outside of the bubble by means of the very act of speaking.   Our 
 We’ve only looked at a single noun. 
There are three basic noun classes in Comitancillo Mam, all of which exhibit the 
same preoccupation with both the ego- and the socio-center—and all of which are 
subject to the two by two by two matrix. Although the paradigm is fuller in 
Comitancillo than in the north, the same analysis will work for both. 
                                                 
4Actually, the ‘missing form’, n-xjalil, is indeed attested in Ixtahuacán, but it does not belong to 
the same paradigm as the other forms in (1). Rather it is used for contrastive emphasis (England, 
1983:143), and only to code lack of solidarity. In this contrastive emphasis structure, lack of the 
clitic, then, does not code speaker-hearer solidarity. Rather, the entire construction codes contras-
tive (lack of solidarity) emphasis. See citation for discussion. 
46
Wesley M. Collins 
Mam data adduce additional evidence to Hanks’ claim since solidarity between 
members of the socio-center—minimally a speaker and a hearer, is the unmarked 
case in the use or not of the clitic.  Lack of solidarity is the marked form among 
members of the socio-center. 
Yet even for Hanks, socio-centricity can be overruled. The socio-center of 
speaker-and-interlocutor as origo can itself become a contested space and conver-
sation can degenerate into a ping-pong match of egocentric moves between 
speaker and interlocutor. 
It appears that our Mam data actually encode both aspects of this sense of cen-
teredness—ego-centrism and socio-centrism. As we’ve seen, the prefixes are 
speaker-centric. Certainly they assume a socio-center with an interlocutor, as per 
Hanks, since the notion of I means nothing unless there is a non-I against which I 
exists. This is the figure-ground relationship implied within Hanks’ view of the 
deictic center. Nevertheless, the actual coding of possession is strictly speaker 
oriented. Something is either mine or not mine, ours or not ours.  
The clitic, however, codes solidarity between speaker and hearer. Its presence 
or absence does not merely assume an interlocutor, it crucially codes for her or 
him. This strengthens the evidence for Hanks’ notion of the deictic center being 
not just a single individual speaker, but a twosome (or more) of culturally compe-
tent actors. Mam then recognizes and codes both the notion of an ego-center and a 
socio-center. 
The importance of these possessive forms is that they are actually the Mam 
instantiation of Mayan Set A ergative markers that code not only possessives, but 
also the agent of transitive verbs and, in relative clauses, both the agent and the 
object of transitives as in (8), as well as the subject of intransitives.  
 
(8)  T-aj-a  tu’n  t-kub’  ky-b’inchin jun ti’.  
 You want them to do something.  
 
With t-aj-a ‘you want’, we have both the t- prefix and the clitic. As with the 
possessives, the t- codes non-first person singular, while the -a clitic marks lack of 
solidarity between interlocutor and speaker. This means ‘you’. The t- prefix of t-
kub’ cross-references the non-first person singular object. Lack of the clitic codes 
solidarity between speaker and hearer, or traditional third person, ‘something’. 
And the ky- prefix of ky-b’inchin marks plural non-first person. With no clitic, it 
codes solidarity with first person—both speaker(s) and interlocutors are not 
involved, leaving traditional ‘third person plural’. 
Not only are the set A markers used far beyond just possession, as I men-
tioned in the previous paragraph, but the same clitic also functions with Set B 
absolutive markers as well, where it again codes lack of solidarity with speaker 
(as it does with Set A markers) while in a morphotactic context where Set A 
prefixes are not found at all. This is further evidence of the independence of the 
clitic from the Set A prefixes. 
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5. Mam Possessives in a Wider Context 
England (1976:259-260) suggests that the Mam enclitic derives from a second 
person honorific marker still extant in Aguacatec, a Mamean language. In short, 
the precursor of Aguacatec third person prefixal forms t- and ky- plus the enclitic 
–u’ became polite second person forms. Mam has lost this honorific sense, while 
maintaining the clitic for second person forms.  
Since Mamean languages are the only Mayan languages to use these clitics in 
conjunction with other affixes to code person, England suggests that the cliticized 
forms are innovative. It is unclear whether the clitics on first person forms devel-
oped from these honorifics or separately. Nor is it clear what the second person 
clitics may have meant in their “post-honorific” stages.  It was perhaps at this 
point that this post-honorific clitic was reanalyzed as an indicator of lack of 
solidarity between speaker and hearer. 
Godfrey (1981:9) points out that for Tacanec (Western) Mam, the clitics are 
all different in each of their four occurrences. Nevertheless, they are each realized 
as either a vowel or vowel plus glottal stop, and they are used in a way corres-
ponding exactly to the same paradigm as the Ixtahuacán data in (1).  
England surmises (p.c.) that the fact that the Tacanec clitics are all different 
supports the notion that the clitics don’t presently—and therefore did not histori-
cally—mean the same thing (as I claim they do now for the Comitancillo data). Of 
course, if we assume that these clitics derived from the same Aguacatec honorific 
clitic, -u’, we don’t know how nor why the Tacanec clitics differentiated into four 
distinct forms. If the single clitic is the historical base, and if it was sufficient, 
together with the possessive prefixes to distinguish all persons, why did it diffe-
rentiate further into four clitics?  In response, Godfrey (p.c.) claims that the 
Tacanec clitics are different from each other because they agree with four differ-
ent person/number markers. But they do more than just repeat information. They 
also specify lack of solidarity between speaker and hearer.  He suggests that in 
other Mam variants, the clitics have collapsed to a single form because the 
repetition of information was unnecessary, having been handled by our two by 
two by two matrix. 
It is also possible that the unusual semantics of a first person singular inclu-
sive form makes such a form likely to be dropped, due to its being overwhelmed 
by the far more common ‘my, not your’ forms.  Under this analysis, the Comitan-
cillo version of the paradigm is conservative, with the first person singular soli-
darity forms having been part of the grammars of other Mam dialects, but subse-
quently lost due to lack of use. 
In any event, how the system has come to be what it is is irrelevant to present 
day speakers who in their daily speech habits care not about diachrony, but 
synchrony. I believe that the data presented here most clearly support the mean-
ings for both the prefixes and the presence or absence of the present-day clitic, as 
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6. Ethnosysntax 
What do we make of all this? It seems that the language is giving us what I’ve 
been calling the two by two by two matrix, which lays out for us, in binary 
fashion, the three categories I’ve outlined in this paper: speaker involvement in 
possession, or not; number (singular or plural), and solidarity between the speaker 
and hearer, or not. These categories have not so much been applied to the data as 
they have emerged from it, based on the notion that what looks similar morpho-
logically should be assumed to be similar unless we can show that the forms are 
indeed divergent. The t- prefix marks the same thing on all forms—non-first 
person, not two things, second and third person. In the same way, the presence or 
absence of the clitic marks the same thing—interlocutor solidarity (or lack the-
reof) with the speaker—not two things: exclusivity and person.  
Mam speakers must deal with both ego-centricity and socio-centricity, phe-
nomena which impose a way of thinking upon speakers of the language. This is 
reminiscent of Slobin’s idea of “thinking for speaking” (1996), where a lan-
guage’s obligatory categories (like tense, number, and person in English or 
Spanish—but not evidentiality or duality—for example, which don’t exist in these 
languages as grammatical categories) must be taken into account before one can 
speak at all. Mam speakers not only identify participants in conversation, coding 
self and non-self, singular and plural. They also code solidarity with the hearer, as 
the hearer is distinguished as participating equally or not with the speaker in the 
matter at hand. 
I have suggested elsewhere (Collins 2005) the importance of a sense of cen-
ter—or balance about such a center—to speakers of Mam in the conception and 
practice of daily life, particularly in terms of health and illness etiology; the 
constructed world of patios and plazas; and religion and cosmology. It may well 
be that this very notion of centeredness as a cultural theme, or what Gossen 
(1986:5) calls a “symbol cluster” is the cultural analogue of a grammatical theme, 
where the sense of a grammatical center grounds deictic notions such as prono-
minal reference, Mam’s complex and ubiquitous directional verbs and auxiliaries, 
and other origo-dependent grammatical features. These types of recurrent gram-
matical features are what Hale calls a “lexico-semantic…motif which functions as 
an integral component in a grammar” (1986:234). Sapir described such interre-
lated grammatical features as “the genius of the language” (1920:120).  
Enfield suggests in his book, Ethnosyntax (2002), that language and culture 
are not only connected, but “interconstitutive, through overlap and interplay 
between people’s cultural practices and preoccupations and the grammatical 
structures they habitually employ” (2002:3-4). To that end, he further suggests 
that “it is well worth exploring the idea that a language’s morphosyntactic re-
sources are related to the cultural knowledge, attitudes, and practices of its 
speakers” (2002:24), or, as Duranti claims, language “both presupposes and 
brings about ways of being in the world (1997:1). Language, then, both reflects 
the culture of its speakers while at the same time standing as the most pervasive 
and effective mechanism in the acculturation of a society’s members. 
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7. Conclusion 
To do the exploration that Enfield envisions, and that Sapir describes, we need to 
look at a language on its own terms and by means of its own terms, not by means 
of categories and paradigms comfortable to us and which fit the data of the 
languages we know. In a field where we are rightly intrigued with what is similar 
about the languages of the world, we must also remember that each language 
stands alone in contrast to all others by means of its own genius. 
We may yet find it easiest to continue to refer to the different Mam possessive 
forms as first, second, and third person, inclusive and exclusive, singular and 
plural. Perhaps this is inevitable as we try to understand Mam in terms of what we 
know about other languages. But if we look at Mam in its own terms, we see 
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